Attack and Improvement on a Certificateless Aggregate Signature Scheme with Constant Length
Hashimoto and Ogata propose a certificateless aggregate signature scheme with a fixed signature length based on bilinear pairings.The safety of the protocol can be attributed to the CDH difficulty problem,and it is proved that the scheme is safe for the Normal-Ⅰ and Ⅱ adversaries in the random oracle model.It is unsafe to ignore the attack of Super-Ⅰ adversary.Firstly,it is proved that this scheme is vulnerable to the attack of Super-Ⅰ adversary,and an improved scheme to resist this attack is given.The new scheme depends on the number of signers,the length is n+1,and the number of operations of the bilinear pairings is 2n+1.Compared with the original scheme,although the operation is slightly increased,the security is enhanced,and it can resist the attacks of all Class Ⅰ and Class Ⅱ adversaries.