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地方政府职能部门的注意力竞争:一个多案例研究

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自下而上的注意力竞争是注意力分配过程的重要组成部分.既有文献多关注自上而下的注意力分配,较少系统性地讨论地方政府职能部门对领导注意力的竞争问题.以"资源依赖性-绩效驱动性"为分析框架,提炼注意力竞争的四种模式,即示弱诉苦型、游说策动型、借势联结型、争先创优型,并选择T县的四个职能部门开展多案例研究,剖析注意力竞争的差异化运作逻辑及其内在关联,研究发现,差异化的注意力竞争策略是职能部门基于特定任务情境的适应性选择,资源依赖性和绩效驱动性的不同条件组合决定了职能部门的多元注意力竞争样态.究其根本,职能部门的注意力竞争标的包括保底线、争权重、冲高线,并且三者存在固定的进阶顺序,这使注意力竞争模式的演变具有特殊规律.从类型学视角理解职能部门注意力竞争,有助于扩宽注意力竞争的理论基础,丰富注意力竞争的经验认知.
Attention Competition Among Local Government Functional Departments:A Multi-case Study
Bottom-up attention competition is a crucial component of the attention allocation process,yet existing literature has predominantly focused on top-down attention allocation,with limited systematic exploration of how local government functional departments compete for leadership attention.Using the"resource dependence-performance drive"analytical framework,this study identifies four distinct modes of attention competition:signaling weakness and complaining,lobbying and inciting,leveraging connections,and striving for excellence.A multi-case study of four functional departments in T County is conducted to analyze the differentiated operational logics and internal dynamics of attention competition.The findings reveal that the varied attention competition strategies employed by functional departments are adaptive responses to specific task contexts.Furthermore,the combinations of resource dependence and performance drive shape the diverse patterns of attention competition.Fundamentally,the targets of attention competition include the bottom line,the weight line,and the high line,with a fixed hierarchical progression among them.This results in a distinctive evolution of attention competition patterns.Understanding attention competition from a typological perspective broadens the theoretical foundation of attention competition and enriches the empirical understanding of this phenomenon within local government departments.

Local GovernmentFunctional DepartmentAttention CompetitionResource DependencePerformance DrivenLocal Governance

庞明礼、梁靖柯

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中南财经政法大学 公共政策研究院,湖北武汉 430073

中南财经政法大学 公共管理学院,湖北武汉 430073

地方政府 职能部门 注意力竞争 资源依赖 绩效驱动 地方治理

2024

行政论坛
黑龙江省行政学院

行政论坛

CSTPCDCSSCICHSSCD北大核心
影响因子:1.013
ISSN:1005-460X
年,卷(期):2024.31(6)