Multiple Large Shareholders and Firm's Labor Investment Efficiency:Working Together or Difficult to Coordinate?
Taking the A-share Chinese listed companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen from 2008 to 2020 as a sample,this paper examines the influence of multiple large shareholders on firms'labor investment efficiency.The results show that multiple large shareholders have played a monitoring role and improved firms'labor investment efficiency,which is reflected in reducing under-employment.The results still hold after controlling for endogenous and a series of robustness tests.Further studies have shown that the greater the number of non-controlling shareholders,the higher the degree of equity separation,and the stronger the relative shareholding power of the second largest shareholder,the monitoring of multiple large shareholders is more effective.We also find that the monitoring effect is stronger for firms facing higher labor adjustment costs,which have more financing constraints,higher proportion of intangible asset and state-owned enterprises.We further investigate the potential mechanism.The results show that the monitoring role of multiple large shareholders in enhancing firms'labor investment efficiency is more important for firms with weak external governance,which have lower stock liquidity,fiercer product market competition,less analysts attention and fewer institutional investors.From the perspective of labor investment decision-making,this paper confirms that multiple large shareholders play the role of corporate governance.The conclusion of this paper has enlightening significance on how to improve the efficiency of labor investment.
Multiple large shareholdersLabor investment efficiencyCorporate governance