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政府参与危险品物流安全协同保障系统演化博弈研究

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为研究政府参与危险品物流安全协同保障系统影响因素及内在机理,采用演化博弈理论分别构建政府企业、危险品委托企业与物流企业之间多方演化博弈模型,探讨安全协同系统构建参与主体均衡策略选择,分析政府参与危险品物流安全协同保障系统演化博弈稳定性.研究结果表明,政府对企业的策略选择是影响决策的重要因素,政府积极推进策略建立起良好的政企互动机制,有利于危险品物流安全协同保障系统的合作演化;危险品委托企业与物流企业协同保障策略选择、投入成本对系统演化具有重要影响,较低安全成本促使双方期望收益高于不进行安全投入期望收益,因此有效降低物流安全协同保障系统构建投入成本是促使两者进行安全投入的关键.
Research on Evolutionary Game of Government Participating in Coordination Guarantee System of Dangerous Goods Logistics Safety
In order to analyze influencing factors and inner mechanism of government participating in coordination guarantee system of dangerous goods logistics safety,evolutionary game theory was used to construct multi-party evolutionary game models among government enterprises,dangerous goods entrusted enterprises and logistics enterprises.Equilibrium strategy choice of participating entities of security coor-dination system was discussed,and evolutionary game stability of government participating in coordination guarantee system of dangerous goods logistics safety was analyzed.The results show that strategy choice of government is an important factor for decision-making.Government's active promotion strategies,that es-tablish a good political-enterprise interaction mechanism,are conducive to cooperative evolution of coordi-nation guarantee system of dangerous goods logistics safety.Strategic choice and input cost of coordination guarantee between dangerous goods entrusted enterprise and logistics enterprise have an important influ-ence on the system evolution.Lower security cost can cause both parties to higher expect returns than that without safety investment,so effectively reducing input cost of logistics safety coordination guarantee sys-tem is the key to promoting safety investment.

dangerous goods logistics safetygovernmentcoordination guaranteeevolutionary gameequilibrium strategy

张广胜、徐旭

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山东管理学院工商学院,山东济南 250357

上海电机学院商学院,上海 201306

危险品物流安全 政府 协同保障 演化博弈 均衡策略

国家社会科学基金山东管理学院博士科研启动基金

21BJY227

2024

系统科学学报
太原理工大学

系统科学学报

北大核心
影响因子:0.478
ISSN:1005-6408
年,卷(期):2024.32(1)
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