首页|政府在应急管理中采取的避责策略生成机理研究——基于不完全契约理论的分析

政府在应急管理中采取的避责策略生成机理研究——基于不完全契约理论的分析

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避责策略作为一种趋利避害的倾向普遍存在于政府决策者中,阻碍了政府的应急管理效能提升.本文运用单案例分析,借助不完全契约理论,提出"应急管理'控制权—索取权'避责策略生成机理分析框架",以"H省C市特别重大居民自建房倒塌事故"为案例,对政府在应急管理中采取的避责策略生成机理进行分析.研究发现:(1)公共权力分配机制缺陷与风险不确定性的存在,驱动了政府采取应急管理避责策略;(2)监督机制失灵催生下级政府过度扩张剩余索取权;(3)上级政府剩余控制权过强将挫败下级政府应急管理积极性.本文据此提出相应政策建议:(1)改进权力分配机制;(2)完善权力监督机制;(3)优化绩效评估体系.
Research on the Mechanisms behind Blame Avoidance Strategies Employed by Governments in Emergency Management——An analysis based on the Theory of Incomplete Contracts
As a tendency to draw on advantages and avoid disadvantages,the blame avoidance strategy is prevalent among government decision-makers,which hinders the enhancement of the government's emergency management effectiveness.By conducting single case analysis in virtue of the Theory of Incomplete Contracts,this article proposes an"Analysis Framework for the Generation Mechanism of Emergency Management'Control Right—Claim Rights'Responsibility Avoidance Strategies".Taking the"particularly major resi-dents'self-built house collapse accident in City C,Province H"as a case in point,it analyzes the generation mechanism of the gov-ernment's responsibility avoidance strategy in emergency management.It has been found through this study(1)that the existence of defects in the public power distribution mechanism and risk uncertainty drives the government to adopt emergency management responsi-bility avoidance strategies,(2)that the failure of the supervision mechanism promotes the excessive expansion of residual claim rights by lower-level governments,and(3)that residual control by higher-level governments excessive power will frustrate the enthusiasm of lower-level governments for emergency management.Based on these findings,this article puts forward corresponding policy suggestions as follows:(1)Improve the power distribution mechanism;(2)Perfect the power supervision mechanism;(3)Optimize the perform-ance evaluation system.

responsibility-avoidance strategiesgeneration mechanismincomplete contracting theory

李立清、李若涛

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湖南农业大学 公共管理与法学学院,湖南 长沙 410128

避责策略 生成机理 不完全契约理论

国家自然科学基金面上项目国家社会科学基金重大项目

7227405922ZDA102

2024

湘潭大学学报(哲学社会科学版)
湘潭大学

湘潭大学学报(哲学社会科学版)

CSTPCDCSSCICHSSCD北大核心
影响因子:0.589
ISSN:1001-5981
年,卷(期):2024.48(3)
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