首页|政府补贴下电商平台与商家联合公益营销的微分博弈模型

政府补贴下电商平台与商家联合公益营销的微分博弈模型

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伴随着互联网公益的兴起,以阿里巴巴和京东为代表的电商平台为国内公益事业的发展注入了强大的动力,但其慈善行为往往包含公益和盈利的双重动机.文章在考虑政府对平台的补贴政策和从事社会公益活动具有多周期动态变化特征的情况下,构建平台和商家的3种微分博弈模型,探讨双方开展联合公益营销的合作问题.研究表明:1)政府的补贴政策可以激励平台和商家加大对社会公益事业的投入,促使平台愿意为商家分担更多的公益成本.2)平台为商家分担公益成本在一定条件下不仅能提升商家的社会公益投入,还能实现双方利润的Pareto改善.3)政府补贴可以提升公益成本分担契约对平台和商家利润的Pareto改善效果,但平台可能会保留部分政府补贴,不会将其全部投入社会公益.4)在协同合作的公益营销情形下,平台、商家和整体的效益以消费者剩余和社会福利都是最优的.最后,通过算例分析验证了结论,以期为平台和商家联合公益营销提供理论依据和参考.
Research on Joint Cause-Related Marketing Strategy Between E-Commerce Platforms and Merchants Under Government Subsidies Based on Differential Game
Along with the rise of Internet public welfare,e-commerce platforms rep-resented by Alibaba and JD have injected a strong impetus into the development of Chinese public welfare.However,the public practices of platforms and merchants often contain both public welfare and profit motives.In this paper,three differential game models are constructed for platforms and merchants to discuss their cooper-ation question about carrying out joint cause-related marketing(CRM),considering the government's subsidy policy for platforms and the characteristics that engaging in social welfare is multi-cycle and dynamic.Our main results are as follows:1)The government subsidies can incentivize platforms and merchants to provide more in-vestments for social welfare,and motivate platforms to be willing to share more CRM costs for merchants.2)Under certain conditions,platforms share a certain percentage of CRM costs for merchants can not only enhance its social welfare investment,but also achieve Pareto improvement of profits for both.3)Government subsidies can improve the Pareto effect of CRM cost-sharing contracts on the profits of platforms and merchants,but platforms may retain some of the government subsidies and will not invest them all in social welfare.4)In the joint CRM case,the benefits of plat-forms,merchants,and the whole system as well as the consumer surplus and social welfare are all optimal.Finally,.our main results are verified via numerical simulation,hoping to provide a theoretical basis and reference for the joint CRM of platforms and merchants.

Joint cause-related marketingplatform goodwillgovernment subsidiescost sharingdifferential game

吴鑫、柳键、张永明、唐艳群、张颖

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江西财经大学信息管理学院,南昌 330013

联合公益营销 平台商誉 政府补贴 成本分担 微分博弈

国家自然科学基金江西省教育厅科学技术研究项目江西省研究生创新专项江西省研究生创新专项江西财经大学学生科研课题(第十八届)

72162018GJJ2200550YC2022-B154YC2020-B03820231014215155484

2024

10.12341/jssms23492

系统科学与数学
中国科学院数学与系统科学研究院

系统科学与数学

CSTPCD北大核心
影响因子：0.425
ISSN：1000-0577
年,卷(期)：2024.44(1)
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