Evolutionary Game Analysis of Information-Sensitive Electronic Waste Recycling Based on Prospect Theory
To solve the dilemma of information-sensitive e-waste recycling under incomplete information,this paper constructed an evolutionary game model composed of government,consumers and recyclers based on prospect theory,and discussed the main factors affecting system game strategy.The results show that the government's increased supervision can promote the standardization of the recycling market.The negative credit evaluation of consumers is conductive to the informal recyclers.The high negative credit evaluation encourages the normalization of the informal recyclers,while the low negative credit evaluation promotes the informal recycling treatment of the recyclers.In the recycling process,if consumers suffer information leakage losses,they tend to distrust strategies,and the greater the information leakage loss,the deeper the degree of distrust.In addition,the loss factors in prospect theory have an impact on the strategies of consumers and recyclers,while the return factors have almost no effect,indicating policymakers pay more attention to loss aversion in the game.
Electronic wasteprospect theorysensitive informationevolutionary game
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