基于前景理论的信息敏感型电子废弃物回收演化博弈分析
Evolutionary Game Analysis of Information-Sensitive Electronic Waste Recycling Based on Prospect Theory
王方 1尹雪薇 1石纯来 1余乐安2
作者信息
- 1. 西安电子科技大学经济与管理学院,西安 710126
- 2. 四川大学商学院,成都 610065
- 折叠
摘要
为破解不完全信息下信息敏感型电子废弃物的回收困境,文章基于前景理论构建了由政府、消费者和回收商组成的演化博弈模型,探讨了影响系统博弈策略的主要因素.结果表明,政府加大监管力度可促进回收市场规范化;消费者负面信誉评价对非正规回收商具有导向性,高负面信誉评价激励非正规回收商规范化形成;回收过程中,消费者若遭受信息泄露损失,便趋向于不信任策略,且信息泄露损失越大不信任程度越深;前景理论中的损失规避系数和损失感知价值敏感系数,对于消费者和回收商的策略均有影响,而收益感知价值敏感系数对两者策略几乎无影响,说明决策者在博弈中更注重规避损失.
Abstract
To solve the dilemma of information-sensitive e-waste recycling under incomplete information,this paper constructed an evolutionary game model composed of government,consumers and recyclers based on prospect theory,and discussed the main factors affecting system game strategy.The results show that the government's increased supervision can promote the standardization of the recycling market.The negative credit evaluation of consumers is conductive to the informal recyclers.The high negative credit evaluation encourages the normalization of the informal recyclers,while the low negative credit evaluation promotes the informal recycling treatment of the recyclers.In the recycling process,if consumers suffer information leakage losses,they tend to distrust strategies,and the greater the information leakage loss,the deeper the degree of distrust.In addition,the loss factors in prospect theory have an impact on the strategies of consumers and recyclers,while the return factors have almost no effect,indicating policymakers pay more attention to loss aversion in the game.
关键词
电子废弃物/前景理论/敏感信息/演化博弈Key words
Electronic waste/prospect theory/sensitive information/evolutionary game引用本文复制引用
基金项目
国家自然科学基金(72001165)
国家自然科学基金(72331007)
陕西省创新能力支撑计划(2022SR5016)
西安市科技计划软科学研究重点项目(23RKYJ0006)
出版年
2024
NETL
NSTL
万方数据