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消费者低碳偏好信息不对称下供应链减排策略研究

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信息不对称是阻碍制造商积极参与碳市场交易及投入减排技术的主要原因,文章基于碳交易机制,在零售商隐匿消费者低碳偏好信息的情形下,研究制造商减排和零售商的信息共享策略选择问题.文章利用Stackelberg模型考察供应链各成员的最优决策,其中零售商拥有私有信息(消费者的低碳偏好)并决定是否与制造商共享该信息.利用博弈论与静态比较分析,发现零售商共享信息对供应链有益,且在信息不对称下,制造商与零售商制定收益共享契约可以提高自身收益.当制造商风险规避程度较低时,零售商愿意共享信息;当消费者低碳偏好较高且对产品价格不敏感时,制造商的减排率会增加;对于减排成本较大且消费者低碳偏好较低的产品,增加碳配额会降低产品的价格,进而削减制造商的减排动力.因此,制造商可以适当降低自身风险规避行为以吸引零售商共享信息,此外,制造商与零售商制定收益共享契约对供应链有利;为加强制造商减排技术的投入,零售商可以优先对非价敏用户做好低碳产品的宣传和推广.
Research on Supply Chain Emission Reduction Strategy Under Asymmetric Information of Consumers'Low-Carbon Preference
Information asymmetry is the main reason that prevents manufacturers from actively participating in carbon market trading and investing in emission reduc-tion technologies.Based on the carbon trading mechanism,this paper studies the choice of manufacturers'emission reduction and retailers'information sharing strate-gies under the condition that retailers hide consumers'low-carbon preference infor-mation.In this paper,Stackelberg model is used to investigate the optimal decisions of each member of the supply chain,in which retailers have private information(con-sumers'low-carbon preferences)and decide whether to share this information with manufacturers.By using game theory and static comparative analysis,it is found that retailers'sharing of information is beneficial to the supply chain,and under the condition of asymmetric information,manufacturers and retailers can improve their own profits by formulating revenue sharing contracts.When the manufacturer's risk aversion is low,retailers are willing to share information;When consumers have high low-carbon preferences and are insensitive to product prices,the emission reduction rate of manufacturers will increase;For products with high emission reduction costs and low consumer preference for low-carbon emission reduction,increasing carbon quotas will reduce the price of products,thereby reducing manufacturers'incentive to reduce emissions.Therefore,manufacturers can appropriately reduce their risk aversion behavior to attract retailers to share information.In addition,it is beneficial for the supply chain to establish revenue sharing contracts between manufacturers and retailers;In order to strengthen the manufacturer's investment in emission reduction technology,retailers can give priority to the promotion and promotion of low-carbon products to non-price sensitive users.

Information asymmetrycarbon trading mechanismrisk avoidanceemis-sion reductionlow carbon preference of consumers

葛泽慧、李新宇、王道平、张运环

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北京科技大学经济管理学院,北京 100083

北京企业低碳运营战略研究基地,北京 100083

信息不对称 碳交易机制 风险规避 减排 消费者低碳偏好

国家自然科学基金国家自然科学基金北京市社会科学基金

718710167187101718JDGLB033

2024

系统科学与数学
中国科学院数学与系统科学研究院

系统科学与数学

CSTPCD北大核心
影响因子:0.425
ISSN:1000-0577
年,卷(期):2024.44(4)
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