Research on Pricing and Subsidy Strategies for Ride-Hailing Platforms During Peak Period
To address the challenges of passenger difficulty in hailing rides and in-sufficient vehicle supply during peak periods,this paper is based on an actual scenario in which ride-hailing platforms implement both surge pricing and subsidy strategies during peak periods,taking into account the heterogeneity of driver supply prices.By incorporating the reference point dependence theory of the driver decision-making and aiming to maximize platform expected profits,a Stackelberg game model is es-tablished to analyze the interaction between the platform and drivers.Kuhn-Tucker theorem is applied to determine the optimal service price and subsidy level for the platform during peak periods.The results reveal that the expected profit of plat-forms during the peak period showed an"inverted U-shape"trajectory as subsidies increased.When the subsidy level is within a critical range,the expected profits of the platform initially increase and then decrease with increasing service prices.The maximum expected profits of the platform are achieved when the critical value(peak point)is reached.By adopting appropriate pricing and subsidy strategies,ride-hailing platforms during peak period can effectively reduce the risk of driver attrition,ad-just supply-demand relationships,and enhance the benefits for both the platform and drivers.
Ride-hailing platformsKKT conditionspricingplatform subsidiesStackelberg game
NETL
NSTL
万方数据
