The Research of Investment Decisions on Quality and Traceability in Supply Chains Under Different Power Structures
In the context of supply chain liability caused by quality defective prod-ucts,how to establish a traceability system is an important question for supply chain enterprises with different power structures.This raises another critical question:Whether establishing a traceability system helps to enhance product quality and supply chain profitability.This study investigates the impact of the retailer's trace-ability on the manufacturer's product quality decision and supply chain profitability by building a two-stage supply chain game model with a manufacturer and a retailer under different power structures,and then explores the retailer's optimal traceabil-ity decision and the impact of the power structures on the supply chain equilibrium results.The equilibrium results show that:1)When the manufacturer is the leader of the supply chain,the retailer has no incentive to establish a traceability system;Otherwise,the retailer tends to establish a traceability system depending on the effi-ciency of traceability investment,and the motivation to establish a traceability system is higher in the vertical Nash structure.2)Traceability improves both product quality and consumer market demand,whereas whether supply chain performance improves or decreases is dependent on both traceability investment efficiency and traceability level.3)Despite the fact that the comparative results of the product quality level under different power structures differ due to traceability,consumers always have the highest market demand in the vertical Nash structure,and there is always a positive relationship between profit and power for each supply chain member.
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