首页|基于非合作-合作两型博弈的新能源投资策略研究

基于非合作-合作两型博弈的新能源投资策略研究

扫码查看
文章提出同时决策、发电商领导决策和零售商领导决策下的非合作-合作两型博弈模型,深入探讨了电力系统中新能源投资决策问题.研究结果表明:1)不同权力结构下的新能源投资量大小取决于传统能源的成本系数;2)发电商和售电商均偏好各自作为供应链的领导者,并实现自身利润最大化,但供应链系统利润在共同决策模型中最优;3)新能源投资成本系数与新能源的投资量以及发电商和售电商的利润成反比,但是发电商的新能源投资成本分摊比例与其成正比;4)新能源偏好系数的增加将提高新能源投资量,且售电商分摊新能源投资成本比例也会增加,从而发电商和售电商的利润也会增加.
Research on New Energy Investment Strategies Based on Noncooperative-Cooperative Biform Game
This paper introduces a noncooperative-cooperative biform game model under simultaneous model,electricity generator-leader model,and electricity retailer-leader model.It delves into the decision-making problem of new energy investment in the power system.The results show that:1)The new energy investment under different power structures depends on the cost coefficient of traditional energy in-vestment.2)Both generators and retailers prefer to be leaders in the supply chains,aiming to maximize their individual profits.However,the overall profit of the supply chain is optimized in the simultaneous model.3)An increase in the cost coefficient of new energy investment will reduce the investment in new energy and the profitability of generators and retailers,but the new energy investment cost-sharing ratio of the electricity generator will increase.4)An increase in the preference coefficient of new energy will increase the investment in new energy and the new energy investment cost-sharing ratio of the electricity retailer will increase,thus increasing the profitability of both the generator and the retailer.

Electricity supply chainnew energynoncooperative-cooperative biform gamepower structure

陈威、罗文、梁开荣、白春光

展开 >

成都理工大学管理科学学院,成都 610059

电子科技大学经济与管理学院,成都 611731

南京信息工程大学管理工程学院,南京 210044

电力供应链 新能源 非合作-合作两型博弈 权力结构

2024

系统科学与数学
中国科学院数学与系统科学研究院

系统科学与数学

CSTPCD北大核心
影响因子:0.425
ISSN:1000-0577
年,卷(期):2024.44(12)