Research on New Energy Investment Strategies Based on Noncooperative-Cooperative Biform Game
This paper introduces a noncooperative-cooperative biform game model under simultaneous model,electricity generator-leader model,and electricity retailer-leader model.It delves into the decision-making problem of new energy investment in the power system.The results show that:1)The new energy investment under different power structures depends on the cost coefficient of traditional energy in-vestment.2)Both generators and retailers prefer to be leaders in the supply chains,aiming to maximize their individual profits.However,the overall profit of the supply chain is optimized in the simultaneous model.3)An increase in the cost coefficient of new energy investment will reduce the investment in new energy and the profitability of generators and retailers,but the new energy investment cost-sharing ratio of the electricity generator will increase.4)An increase in the preference coefficient of new energy will increase the investment in new energy and the new energy investment cost-sharing ratio of the electricity retailer will increase,thus increasing the profitability of both the generator and the retailer.