Considering the tripartite game system of"2 strong and 1 weak",in the case that extrater-ritorial power intervenes the military crisis,this paper analyzes the influence factors of three parts'strategies in military crisis.It uses the evolutionary game theory to establish the evolutionary game model of the strategies for trigger(MCT),intervener(MCI)and responder(MCR)in military crisis,then it analyzes the stability of three parts'strategies,and establishes the system dynamics(SD)model for simulation experiments.Finally,it analyzes the influences of the initial probabilities of tri-partite strategy selection,and the counterattack intensity of the MCR to MCT.The results are as fol-lows:the independent initial probabilities of MCT,MCI and MCR to choose confrontation,active in-tervention and aggressive response,all exert an important impact on the evolution of their respective strategy.Increasing the degree of counterattack by the MCR against the MCT will help reverse the strategies'development of MCI and MCT.When MCI chooses active intervention,it's not enough to increase the degree of counterattack by the MCR against the MCT,and it's also necessary for MCR to raise the initial probability of aggressive response to reverse MCT's strategy.
tripartite perspectivemilitary crisisresponse strategyevolutionary game
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