平台产品盗版背景下政府监管措施和创新激励策略
Governmental Supervision and Innovation Incentives for Platforms in the Presence of Goods Piracy
史倚凡 1李常洪 1王佳洛1
作者信息
- 1. 山西大学经济与管理学院,山西太原 030031
- 折叠
摘要
基于信息产品的盗版问题,本文考虑政府打击盗版和激励平台创新,构建了盗版平台、正版平台和政府参与的博弈模型,分析了不同政策对盗版行为和社会福利的影响,为政府政策制定提供参考和依据.研究发现,当政府以降低盗版产品市场份额为目标时,政府始终应采取强监管政策,并且依据质量创新水平制定合适的惩罚和激励措施;当政府以社会福利最大化为目标时,随着盗版水平的增加,政府应该先后采取弱监管和创新激励政策、强监管政策、强监管和创新激励政策.
Abstract
Based on the issue of information goods piracy,we consider the government's efforts to crack down on piracy and incentivize platform innovation.We develop a game model involving a piracy platform,an information platform,and the government,and analyze the implications of different policies on piracy and social welfare,to provide references and bases for the government's policy formulation.We find that when the government aims to reduce pirated goods'market share,it is the best choice for the government to adopt a strict supervision policy and formulate appropriate incentives and penalties according to the level of quality innovation.When the government aims to maximize social welfare,as the piracy level increases,the optimal policy sequence of government is weak supervision and innovation incentives,strict supervision,and strict supervision and innovation incentives.
关键词
信息产品/盗版行为/政府监管/博弈论/创新激励Key words
Information goods/Piracy/Government supervision/Game theory/Innovation incentives引用本文复制引用
出版年
2024
NETL
NSTL
万方数据