J.R.Searle approaches the study of social ontology from the perspective of linguistic philosophy,advocating that language is the basic constituent factor of institutional facts.However,three difficulties arise in his argument:there may be infi-nite regression or circular argument between thought and fact;language is different from other institutional facts,but it can con-firm itself;in the transition from brute facts at the lowest level to institutional facts,language plays a crucial role,but it presup-poses this lowest level of transition.Josef Moural and others also have recognized Searle's difficulty and advocated that the lowest level of transition could be achieved solely through intentionality,and abandoned Searle's core view that"institutional facts de-pend on language".This paper criticizes the views of Moural on the one hand,and upholds Searle's core viewpoint on the other hand.On the basis of clarifying the important concepts of Searle,the paper reconsiders the relationship between"status func-tions and language"and"intentionality and language",and is committed to achieving the solution of the triple difficulties,thereby answering the question of why institutional facts rely on language at a deeper level and in a clearer way.