"Extended nuclear deterrence"has been the basic means of the United States to build and maintain alliances from the Cold War to the present.But its modes of operation can be widely different in terms of regions.Since the late 1950s,the United States has gradually built up a"nuclear sharing"mechanism within NATO to address the"credibility"problem of extended nuclear deterrence in Europe.In contrast,during the same period in East Asia,the U.S.has not introduced a similar program to its two major allies,namely Japan and South Korea,and continued to adhere to the"nuclear monopoly"model.This research ar-gues that"the larger power gap between East Asian allies and the United States"as well as"the lack of major crisis events during the critical periods"are the two main factors preven-ting the U.S.-Japan and U.S.-South Korea alliances from reaching"nuclear sharing"of NATO style.Of these,the effect of the former factor is more decisive.In addition,the U.S.withdrawal of all land-based tactical nuclear weapons from East Asia at the end of the Cold War completely eliminated the opportunity for Japan and South Korea to pursue"nuclear sharing."Nevertheless,in the context of global and regional changes,the possibility that the U.S.would significantly change the extended nuclear deterrence mode in East Asia can-not be completely ruled out.
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