Categorical Construction of Legal Regulation of State-Funded Corporate Groups
State-funded corporate groups exhibit strategic variations due to differences in market economy and public interest missions,necessitating categorical settings in governance structure and functions.However,the Corporate Law does not directly provide adjustment rules for corporate groups,nor does it address the public interest needs of state-funded companies.Given this,in line with the"categorical reform"policy aimed at separating market economy and public interest missions,it is necessary to categorically construct legal regulatory paradigms for the governance of state-owned corporate groups,respecting the path dependency of Corporate Law.For public welfare groups,the"single enterprise"paradigm should affirm the legitimacy of the parent company's control,positively enumerate the powers of subsidiary companies to ensure residual control rights belong to the parent company,and repair the impairment of the subsidiary's independent personality through cost accounting and profit compensation.For commercial typeⅠgroups,adherence to the"separate entity"paradigm under Corporate Law should ensure the independence of group member companies,with post hoc remedies for infringed corporate personalities through the denial of corporate personality system.For commercial type Ⅱ groups,the"separate entity"paradigm should be primarily used,with segregated accounting for special businesses serving public missions.
state-funded corporationsgroup governancecategorical reformpower distribution
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