Analysis on the Evolution of Firm Quantity Scale in Shared Manufacturing System
Shared manufacturing is the infiltration,integration and innovation of sharing economy into the field of production and manufacturing.It connects manufacturing resource supply and demand firms,gathers idle resources in manufacturing,and allows manufacturing resources such as products,production capacity,and technology to flow between supply and demand firms.It is of great significance for the optimal allocation of idle manufacturing resources to clarify the characteristics and interaction modes of the participants in the shared manufacturing system,to study the types and modes of shared manufacturing,and to explore the evolution path and stable state of firm participation and system scale.The research problem of this paper comes from the collaborative shared manufacturing system in reality,which is composed of resource sharing platform and manufacturing resource supply and demand firms.The platform accepts external orders and undertakes service such as supply and demand firms matching and dealmaking.Manufacturing resource supply and demand firms share manufacturing resources,collaborate in manufacturing products,and distribute order revenue through the platform.Considering that resource sharing platform,manufacturing resource supply and demand firms participate in the co-construction of shared manufacturing system is a long-term and dynamic process,the evolutionary game method is used to build a tripartite evolutionary game model.First,the payoff matrix of the tripartite game in the shared manufacturing system is obtained from the realistic state,and the replication dynamic equation is obtained based on the Malthusian equation and the expected return function of each participant.Second,the game equilibrium point is decided by evolutionary game theory,the Lyapunov stability theory is used to determine the asymptotic stability of the system.Third,this paper solves the parameter range of different evolutionary stable states,select data from the parameter range of each evolutionary stable state,and explore the trajectory and speed of the evolution process through numerical simulation.Final,the effects of transaction costs,information costs,network externality benefits,platform matching rate and shared benefits distribution on the system evolution process are analyzed.First,from the perspective of the process of all parties co-constructing shared manufacturing system,in the early stage of system construction,the number of supply and demand firms to join the platform is relatively small,the platform is unwilling to invest too much operating costs and tends to a low-level operation strategy;in the midterm of system construction,with the continuous improvement of the enthusiasm of supply firms to participate in sharing,the number of demand firms to participate in sharing is also increasing.At this time,even if the platform tends to a low-level operation strategy,the supply and demand firms in the system will also participate in sharing;with the number of supply and demand firms participating in sharing increasing and the platform operation maturing,the platform will tend to a high level operation to attract more firms to join the platform,and the sharing system will enter a virtuous circle.Second,it is found that higher transaction costs and information costs will restrain the enthusiasm of both supply and demand firms to join the platform,while higher network externality and matching rate will increase the enthusiasm of both supply and demand firms to join the platform.In addition,when the operating costs generated by the two parties joining the platform are relatively close,more equal distribution of shared benefits between supply and demand firms will promote firms of both sides to actively participate in sharing.Third,from the point of the evolution process,it is found that when all parties in the system tend to passively participate in the co-construction of the sharing system,the demand firms are more active and eager to quickly withdraw from the sharing system and avoid transaction costs,and evolve to a stable strategy faster.On the contrary,when all parties in the system tend to actively participate in the co-construction of the sharing system,it is found that the supply firms are more active,hoping to match the idle manufacturing resources with the demand side through sharing,so as to expand the market scale and obtain shared benefits.The speed of evolution to a stable strategy under this circumstance is faster.Based on the collaborative shared manufacturing system in practice and considering the bounded rationality of the participants,this study uses the evolutionary game method to explore the long-term strategy of each participant in repeated decision-making and the stable state of the shared manufacturing system from a dynamic perspective.The effects of important characteristics such as cost threshold,platform bilateral transaction costs and shared benefits distribution on the shared manufacturing system are analyzed,which bridges the research gap that only select the static perspective and describe the structural characteristics of the general shared manufacturing system.This paper has three main managerial implications:first,the platform should actively take various measures,such as improving the operation level,to improve the matching rate between supply and demand firms,attract more manufacturing resources supply and demand firms to join the platform,and expand the scale of the sharing system.Second,supply firms can join the platform more actively,while demand firms need to be more patient in the sharing system.The government can encourage supply and demand firms to participate in sharing through subsidies when only one party joins.Third,all parties must consider the fairness of the distribution of shared benefits between supply and demand firms,otherwise it may cause one party to leave the platform,and the number of shared transactions will decrease sharply,which will eventually lead to the collapse of the sharing system.The fair distribution of shared benefits can be achieved through the platform formulating clear transaction rules or the supervision of other third party such as government.
shared manufacturingcloud manufacturingservice-oriented manufacturingsharing economyevolutionary game
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