Institutional Spillover Effects of Compliance Regulation on Enterprise Risk Taking—Quasi Natural Experiment Based on Compliance Regulatory Policies of State-owned Assets
Institutional Spillover Effects of Compliance Regulation on Enterprise Risk Taking—Quasi Natural Experiment Based on Compliance Regulatory Policies of State-owned Assets
Against the backdrop of comprehensively promoting legal governance of enterprises,the institutional effect of the compliance regulatory policy system has gradually become a focus of attention in the academic community.This article con-structs a quasi natural experiment based on the"Guidelines for Central Enterprise Compliance Management(Trial)"issued by the State owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission of the State Council,and empirically examines the impact and mechanism of compliance supervision on enterprise risk taking from the perspective of institutional spillovers.Research has found that compliance regulation has an institutional spillover effect on reducing the level of enterprise risk tak-ing.Mechanism analysis shows that compliance supervision mainly suppresses risk taking by improving the internal control level of enterprises;The internal and exter-nal institutional environment has a significant regulatory effect.Further research has shown that compliance regulation mainly reduces the level of abnormal risk taking by enterprises.This article not only reveals the mechanism path of the transmission of compliance regulatory policies to enterprises,but also provides preliminary empiri-cal evidence for the policy effectiveness of the integration of compliance manage-ment,internal control,and risk management.The conclusion has important impli-cations for improving the compliance regulatory policy system and promoting high-quality development of enterprises.
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