Evolutionary game analysis of foreign gold OA journal publishers,Chinese scientists,and their affiliated scientific research institutions
[Purposes]This study aims to explore the tripartite evolutionary game mechanism and stability strategy of open access(OA)publishing and discuss the indirect intervention regime of Chinese scientific research institutions to foreign gold OA journals.[Methods]This study constructed a game model of OA publishing evolution with Chinese scientists,foreign publishers of gold OA journals,and Chinese scientific research institutions as the main players and analyzed the interaction mechanism and stability of their strategies.It also analyzed the effects of article processing charges,expected rejection rate,and scientific research institutions'regulation strategies on the game results through numerical simulation.[Findings]The equilibrium points and simulation analysis show that foreign OA journal publishers may choose two opposite strategies,namely improving or reducing the quality of the journal,which depends on the trade-offs made by scientists and scientific research institutions regarding academic benefits,time costs,and economic expenses.Scientific research institutions have strong independence in the three-party game and can effectively intervene in the outcome.[Conclusions]China's scientific research institutions can capitalize on their market advantages to leverage the scientific research performance evaluation system,thereby regulating scientists'willingness to submit manuscripts.By intervening in the pricing and quality management strategies of foreign gold OA journal publishers and curtailing the emergence of foreign predatory journals,the overall efficiency of China's scientific research ecosystem can be enhanced.
Open access journalScientistForeign gold open access journal publisherResearch institutionEvolutionary gameChinese perspective
NETL
NSTL
万方数据
