摘要
定增并购资产估值不当会引发金融风险.基于金融风险防范的微观治理视角,构建非控股大股东退出威胁对定增并购资产估值的检验模型并进行实证分析.研究发现:退出威胁能降低资产估值虚高;经理人持股市值、控股股东持股市值及其股权质押会增强退出威胁与资产估值虚高的关系,经理人关系嵌入强度会减弱退出威胁与资产估值虚高的关系;退出威胁促进资产估值合理化能显著提高定增并购绩效,并主要通过业绩承诺机制和声誉约束机制发挥作用;在退出威胁可信度高、退出威胁强度高、民企及低市场化进程中退出威胁的治理效果更加显著.
Abstract
Inappropriate asset valuation of private placement and acquisitions can lead to financial risk.Based on the micro-governance perspective of financial risk prevention,this article constructs a testing model for the impact of non-controlling large shareholders'exit threats on the asset valuation and conducts empirical analysis.Research has found that exit threats can reduce inflated asset valuation.The market value of managers'holdings,the market value of controlling shareholders'holdings,and their equity pledges will enhance the connection between exit threats and inflated asset valuation,while the embedding strength of manager relationship will weaken the connection between exit threats and inflated asset valuation.Exit threats promote the rationalization of asset valuation,which can significantly improve the performance of private placement and acquisitions,and mainly play a role through performance commitment mechanism and reputation constraint mechanism.The governance effectiveness of exit threats is more significant in the process of high credibility,high intensity,private enterprises,and low marketization.
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