政策信号的多层级传递与市级政府行为合规:基于环境信息公开案例的实证研究
Multilevel transmission of policy signals and compliance of lower-level governments:An empirical study based on the case of environmental information disclosure
李珒1
作者信息
- 1. 中央财经大学政府管理学院,北京 100081
- 折叠
摘要
政策信号是传递上级政府治理意向、激励下级政府行为合规的重要手段.分析政策信号多层级作用机制下市级政府2008-2018 年环境信息公开行为发现,政府组织中的上层与中层信号均会显著影响下层政府合规行为;在多层级传递过程中,政策信号的影响随行政级别差异的增加而减弱;中间环节传递的不一致信号会削弱上层政府信号效果;在交互作用中,上层政府的"强信号"将翻转中层政府的"不一致"信号,而"弱信号"则可能被后者抵消.在此基础上,提出研究结论与政策建议.
Abstract
Policy signals are an important means of conveying the governance intentions of higher-level governments and motivating lower level governments to act in compliance.Analyzing the multi-level mechanism of policy signals and the environmental information disclosure behavior of city-level governments from 2008 to 2018,it was found that both upper-and middle-level governments'signals significantly affect the compliance behavior of lower-level governments.In the process of multi-level transmission,the influence of policy signals weakens with the increase of administrative level differences.The inconsistent signals transmitted in the intermediate links will weaken the signal effect of the upper-level governments.In the interactions,the"strong signal"of the upper-level government will flip the"inconsistent"signal of the middle-level governments,while the"weak signal"may be offset by the latter.On this basis,research conclusions and policy recommendations were proposed.
关键词
政策执行/政策信号/市级政府/行为合规Key words
policy implementation/policy signals/city-level governments/behavioral compliance引用本文复制引用
基金项目
国家自然科学基金青年基金(72104260)
出版年
2024
NETL
NSTL
万方数据