The Optimization of Governance Structure of Occupational Annuity in China from the Perspective of Information Economics
In order to cope with the soaring expenditure of public pension funds and the enormous challenges faced by governments in an aging society,countries have successively introduced occupational annuity systems,introducing employers,employees and other entities to share pension risks.China has successively introduced two systems:enterprise annuity and occupational annuity to address the risk of aging through a shared responsibility mechanism.Due to regulatory policy delays,lack of process and methods,and insufficient internal motivation,the governance structure of occupational annuity urgently needs to be optimized.From the perspective of information economics,this paper analyzes the problems of information efficiency,participation constraints,and incentive compatibility in the governance structure of occupational annuity from the perspective of agency theory.The results show that improving information efficiency,scientifically setting incentive measures,and strengthening the supervision system are conducive to optimizing the governance structure of occupational annuity.By optimizing the design of occupational annuity schemes,policy designs aim to enhance their attractiveness to participants.Only by promoting perfect agency behavior through mechanism design can programs ensure that the governance of occupational annuity meets the goal of maximizing the interests of the principal.The optimization of the governance structure of occupational annuity can enhance the attractiveness and efficiency of the system,and provide better pension security for retirees.
occupational annuityagency by agreementgovernance structureadverse selectionmoral hazardparticipation constraintincentive compatibility
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