The reform of the state-owned assets supervision system,which focuses on "capital management",is an important measure to deepen the reform of state-owned enterprises in China. Its implementation effect directly affects the goal of preserving and increasing the value of state-owned capital and the high-quality development of state-owned enterprises. Based on the theory framework of competitive neutrality,this paper analyzes the mechanism and effect of the impact of reform on the efficiency of enterprise capital allocation,and takes state-owned A-share listed companies in China from 2010 to 2022 as the research objects,using a multi-period difference in differences model for empirical testing. The results show that the capital allocation efficiency of state-owned enterprises affected by the reform has been significantly improved,which can be promoted through reducing the policy burden of state-owned enterprises,optimizing corporate governance and information disclosure quality,etc. This indicates that the reform of the state-owned asset supervision system,which focuses on "capital management",is in line with the principle of competitive neutrality and development goals emphasized in state-owned enterprise reform. Heterogeneity analysis finds that the capital allocation efficiency of state-owned enterprises located in developed regions and capital intensive industries is more significantly affected by reforms. The research provides empirical evidence for the scientificity and feasibility of the reform of the state-owned asset supervision system,which focuses on "capital management". It has reference significance for continuously deepening the reform of state-owned assets and enterprises and achieving the preservation and appreciation of state-owned capital.
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