"Policy Performance Competition"in Local Government Policy Implementation Process——Model Construction and Case Analysis
"Policy performance competition"is a phenomenon that is common but seldom analyzed in the process of local government policy implementation in China.Based on the field observation of the process of three rural revitalization"policy performance competitions"in T-zone,using the game analysis method of policy implementation research,this paper constructs and presents the theoretical model and operation picture of"policy performance competition"in the context of China's policy implementation.The findings indicate that:"policy performance competition"refers to a competitive incentive mechanism in which the high-level government inspects and evaluates the policy implementation of several low-level governments and decides the distribution of rewards and punishments according to the evaluation results;the incompleteness of the game relationship between the upper and lower levels of the government in the operation of this mechanism leads to the changing incentive effect of"policy performance competition".This paper attempts to demonstrate the academic connotation and empirical significance of"policy performance competition"as a theoretical concept to analyze the incentive of policy implementation,in order to provide theoretical insights and practical reference for the design of the incentive structure reform of government organizations.
policy implementation of local government"policy performance competition"game modelcase analysisorganizational economics
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