激励扭曲视角下我国民营医院激励机制问题研究
Incentive mechanisms of private hospitals in China:from the perspective of incentive distortion
吕朋朋 1刘泳杏 2杨风 2罗光强 2吕惠2
作者信息
- 1. 200080 上海,上海市虹口区爱国卫生和健康促进中心
- 2. 桂林医学院人文与管理学院
- 折叠
摘要
基于激励扭曲视角,深入分析我国民营医院激励机制存在的问题及原因,认为多任务并行、产出结果难以测量、多重委托代理关系和忽视代理人特征是造成民营医院激励扭曲现象产生的主要原因.针对上述原因,提出4点建议:提高民营医院多任务管理能力;健全民营医院治理机制;规范民营医院绩效考核标准;推进民营医院企业文化建设.期望藉此优化民营医院激励机制,促进我国民营医院稳定发展.
Abstract
From the perspective of incentive distortion,this article analyzes the problems in the incentive mechanisms of private hospitals in China and their causes.The main reasons for the incentive distortion in private hospitals are multi-task parallelism,difficulty in output measurement,multiple principal-agent relationships,and ignoring of the characteristics of agents.Accordingly,it is important for private hospitals to improve their multi-task management abilities,optimize the governance mechanisms,standardize the performance evaluation standards,and promote the construction of corporate culture.These optimized incentive mechanisms are expected to promote the sustainable development of private hospitals in China.
关键词
民营医院/激励机制/激励扭曲/医疗管理/不规范行为Key words
Private hospitals/Incentive mechanism/Incentive distortion/Healthcare引用本文复制引用
出版年
2024
NETL
NSTL
维普
万方数据