首页|Decentralization,Supervision,and Chinese Local Government Debt

Decentralization,Supervision,and Chinese Local Government Debt

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Decentralization can alter the incentive structure of local governments and one outcome of this is debt accumulation.Based on the"Province-Managing-County"pilot policy,a fiscal decentralization reform devolving fiscal power from the prefecture-level city to the county level,we assess the impact offiscal decentralization on local government debt using a difference-in-differences model with a unique county-level dataset from 2011 to 2019.According to the study findings,the"Province-Managing-County"reform resulted in an average increase of 5.758 percent in the local government debt ratio across the pilot counties.Mechanism analyses suggest that this may have arisen from changes in the incentive structure,including external pressures from government assessments and internal developmental needs for promotion,leading to a rise in expenditure pressures on local governments.The role of supervision in mitigating the impact offiscal decentralization on debt growth was also demonstrated,indicating that an appropriate supervision mechanism must be in place in conjunction with a decentralization policy.

fiscal decentralizationincentive structurelocal government debtsupervision

Chunfei Yang、Yongyou Li、Yu Qi、Yanzhe Xu

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School of Economics and Management,Wuhan University,China

School of Economics,Shandong University,China

School of Public Finance and Taxation,Zhongnan University of Economics and Law,China

National Natural Science Foundation of ChinaNational Natural Science Foundation of ChinaNational Natural Science Foundation of ChinaNational Social Science Foundation of ChinaFundamental Research Funds for the Central Universities of Zhongnan University of Economics and Law

71973118721731367210320820&ZD0802722024AK004

2024

中国与世界经济(英文版)
中国社会科学院 世界经济与政治研究所

中国与世界经济(英文版)

ISSN：1671-2234
年,卷(期)：2024.32(4)