中国政法大学学报2024,Issue(2) :149-166.

地方政府财政重整的规范逻辑与制度建构——兼论破产法律框架的价值与局限

刘子茜
中国政法大学学报2024,Issue(2) :149-166.

地方政府财政重整的规范逻辑与制度建构——兼论破产法律框架的价值与局限

刘子茜1
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作者信息

  • 1. 清华大学法学院
  • 折叠

摘要

破产法为应对地方政府债务危机提供了一揽子化债思路.确保处于财政困境的地方政府继续履行公共职责是地方财政重整制度的主要目标.美国市政破产制度为地方政府的财政恢复提供了喘息空间,但对地方政府的过度保护有碍重整程序的及时启动和债务调整计划的充分谈判.直接从企业重整程序引致来的法院强裁标准在市政破产中难以适用,反而助长少数异议债权人的拖延钳制.我国在构建地方财政重整制度时应对破产法规范进行有益借鉴和适当调整,并对相应的权力配置机制予以本土化改造.

Abstract

Bankruptcy law provides local government in fiscal crisis with a full range of debt-solving system.The main objective of municipal fiscal reorganization is to ensure that local governments can consistently fulfill their public functions.Chapter nine of the U.S.Code offers municipalities opportunities for fiscal recovery,while implementing over-protection on local governments may hinder prompt start of reorganization procedures as well as fully bargain on debt adjustment plans.Compulsory sanction in Chapter 11 can hardly be applied in municipal bankruptcy for its ambiguity,leading to few dissenting creditors'delaying clampdown.When establishing the local government fiscal reorganization system in China,certain bankruptcy rules should be adopted or adjusted,correspondingly reforming the power allocation.

关键词

重整不清算/财政困境/公共职能/制度成本/权力配置

Key words

reorganization without liquidation/fiscal distress/public functions/institutional cost/power allocation

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基金项目

北京市社会科学基金(23FXB012)

出版年

2024
中国政法大学学报

中国政法大学学报

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ISSN:
参考文献量114
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