首页|基于三方演化博弈论的相向流人群疏散行为研究

基于三方演化博弈论的相向流人群疏散行为研究

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为探究相向流人群疏散行为,基于考虑疏散指挥者对疏散过程的引导作用,构建包含正向流人群、逆向流人群和疏散指挥者的三方演化博弈模型,分析三方在参与博弈后策略选择的稳定性,并通过数值仿真探究场地宽度、人员密度、合作收益、逆流任务收益、场地熟悉程度、管理强度、事故惩罚等因素对应急疏散系统演化稳定性的影响.研究结果表明:三方博弈主体策略转换联动性较强;相向流人群的竞争或合作策略主要受到合作收益、逆流任务收益和场地熟悉程度影响;盲目提高指挥者的管理强度可能会迫使指挥者放弃管理.研究结果可为减少疏散人员逆向流行为和提高疏散指挥者管理能力提供一定参考.
Study on evacuation behavior of bi-directional flow crowd based on tripartite evolutionary game theory
In order to explore the evacuation behavior of bi-directional flow crowd,considering the evacuation commander's management of evacuation process,a tripartite evolutionary game model including the forward flow crowd,the counter flow crowd and the evacuation commander was constructed.The stability of the three parties'strategy selection after participating in the game was analyzed,and the influence of site width,personnel density,cooperation income,counter flow task income,site familiarity,management intensity,accident punishment and other factors on the evolutionary stability of emergency evacu-ation system was explored by numerical simulation,.The results show that the main strategy conversion of the tripartite game has strong linkage.The competition or cooperation strategy of bi-directional flow crowd is mainly influenced by cooperation in-come,counter flow task income and site familiarity.Blindly improving the management intensity of commander may force the commander to give up management.The research results can provide some theoretical support for reducing the counter flow behavior of evacuation personnel and improving the management ability of evacuation commanders.

emergency evacuationbi-directional flow crowdevacuation commanderevolutionary game theory

凤四海、蓝航宇、熊永怡、熊升华

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中国民用航空飞行学院 民航安全工程学院,四川 广汉 618307

中国民用航空飞行学院 飞行技术学院,四川 广汉 618307

应急疏散 相向流人群 疏散指挥者 演化博弈论

四川省科技计划民机火灾科学与安全工程四川省重点实验室自主项目

2022YFG0213MZ2022JB03

2024

中国安全生产科学技术
中国安全生产科学研究院

中国安全生产科学技术

CSTPCD北大核心
影响因子:1.119
ISSN:1673-193X
年,卷(期):2024.20(3)
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