Game model of government-enterprise joint reserve pricing of emergency materials based on flexible contract
In order to improve the support ability and resilience of emergency materials and control the cost of government procurement,a game model of the government-enterprise joint reserve pricing of emergency materials based on flexible con-tract was constructed.Aiming at minimizing the cost of government procurement and maximizing the profit of suppliers,the backward induction method was used to solve the suppliers'decision-making on the optimal physical reserve quantity and raw material reserve quantity and the government's decision-making on the optimal pricing in turn,and the numerical simulation verification and sensitivity analysis of variables were conducted.The results show that compared with the government's sole reserve mode,this model can improve the level of emergency materials reserve,improve the ability of government to cope with emergencies,reduce the cost of government procurement and improve the income of suppliers,and achieve a win-win situation for both government and enterprises.The high disaster probability prompts the government to increase reserve and enterprises to adjust production.The large-scale conventional procurement by the government will bring stable benefits to enterprises,and the enterprises will increase the quantity of raw material reserve when the supply rate of spot market is large,that is,the prob-ability of disaster occurrence,the purchase price of spot market,the quantity of conventional procurement by the government,the supply rate of spot market and other factors influence the decision-making and cost-benefit of both government and enter-prises.The research results can provide reference for the government and enterprises to make decisions on emergency materi-als reserve quantity,purchase price and incentive enterprises to cooperate in reserve.
万方数据
维普
