摘要
研究目的：解读中国农村土地制度历史变迁规律，分析现阶段农村土地制度改革的取向。研究方法：通过构建中央政府、地方政府、农民集体、农民4方动态进化博弈模型，分析新中国成立后农村土地制度历史变迁中各利益主体博弈进化关系特征及约束条件。研究结果：生成了各利益主体进化博弈关系表及策略对比趋势图。研究结论：（1）新中国成立后农村土地制度以中央政府强制性制度变迁为主导；（2）中国农村土地制度变迁是一个由强制性向诱致性过渡的历史过程，中国农村土地制度的改革应该顺应这种趋势；（3）农民集体是中国农村土地制度历史变迁中中央政府策略选择不完全的产物，其产权关系不清、权能缺失。（4）应该有针对性地完善现行土地产权制度，促使现行农村土地制度由城乡二元体制向一元体制过渡。
Abstract
The purpose of this study is to interpret the regularity of the historical evolution and the reform direction of rural land system in China. Methods include a dynamic evolutionary game model among central government, local gov-ernments, rural collective organizations and farmers. The main result of this paper is a diagram that represents the com-parison and the tendency of game strategy of the interest subject, which is obtained through analyzing the characteristics and the constraint conditions of evolutionary relationship of the interest subject in the processes of the rural land system change. The main conclusions are as follows. 1)The institutional change of rural land system was driven by the central government since the establishment of PRC;2)Generally, Chinese rural land system change shows a trend from forced pattern to induced pattern. Therefore, the ongoing reform of Chinese rural land system should follow the trend;3) The rural collective organizations are the result of the incomplete strategic chosen by the central government in the history change of Chinese rural land system, which caused the vague of collective property right and the lack of power. 4)The farmland ownership should be ameliorated from the current dual-track system between rural and urban sectors to an in-tegrated one.
NETL
NSTL
维普
万方数据