With the continuous development of power demand side management (DSM) in China,enhancing the participation of key stakeholders,such as power grid enterprises and electricity users,has become an urgent issue to address. By constructing a dynamic evolutionary game model involving the government,power grid enterprises,and electricity users,the paper analyzes the interaction mechanisms,cost-benefit relationships,and the external ef-fects among the three parties under different game strategies,as well as the stability of the system's equilibrium points. Based on this analysis,the scientific rigor of the dynamic evolutionary game model is validated through simu-lation. The results indicate that when the government increases incentive while balancing its own costs and benefits,and when the positive external effects for grid enterprises or electricity users increase,the participation levels of all parties significantly rise. Consequently,the time required to achieve a steady-state equilibrium in power demand side management is also reduced.
power demand side managementdynamic evolutionary game modelexternal effectsevolutionarily stable strategy
维普
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