The new demarcation problem in science and its solutions:Taking Douglas's functionalist demarcation strategy as an example
The problem of new demarcation in science has attracted increasing attention and discussion among philosophers of science.This problem stems from the general rejection of the value-free ideal in scientific activities.Since scientific activities cannot completely avoid the participation of values,how to distinguish the legitimate and illegitimate roles of values in scientific activities and how to protect the truth and authority of science under the influence of non-epistemic values become an important issue.In order to resolve the new demarcation problem,Douglas proposed a functionalist demarcation strategy to distinguish the direct and indirect roles of value in scientific activities to balance the relationship between value and science.However,this widely discussed strategy is still flawed,especially because it cannot be applied to areas that do not share the same set of values.Many philosophers have criticized Douglas's functionalist demarcation strategy and instead provide a complete set of criteria for the resolution of the new demarcation problem,and at the same time develop various alternative theories.But these theories still have inevitable difficulties in solving the new demarcation problem.Therefore,further exploration is needed to address this problem.
value-free idealthe new demarcation problemDouglasepistemic valuenon-epistemic value