As the key content of social responsibility with Chinese characteristics,targeted poverty alleviation(TPA)embodies the important spirit of sustainable corporate development.However,performance commitments in M&A contexts may induce or even exacerbate management's pursuit of short-term performance targets.Using the sample of China's A-share listed companies from 2016 to 2021,this study examines the impact of performance commitments in M&A on corporate TPA practices.We find that entering into M&A performance commitments can significantly inhibit corporate engagement in TPA by increasing performance pressure and agency costs.External supervision entities including institutional investors,media,and analysts have an asymmetric impact on this relationship.Institutional investor ownership and media coverage would mitigate the adverse impact of performance commitments,whereas analyst attention exacerbates this negative relationship.Additionally,both overstated and non-overstated performance commitments negatively affect corporate TPA.The nature of enterprise property and the fulfillment of performance commitments lead to heterogeneous effects on corporate TPA practices.This study has important reference significance for improving the regulation of performance commitments,enhancing corporate TPA,and strengthening external supervision mechanisms.
国家科技期刊平台
NSTL
万方数据
