问询函监管对股东并购决策投票行为的影响
王思雨 1范合君2
作者信息
- 1. 河南师范大学商学院,河南 新乡 453007
- 2. 首都经济贸易大学工商管理学院,北京 100070
- 折叠
摘要
本文以2015-2020年沪深A股上市公司重大资产重组事件为样本,研究问询函监管对股东并购决策投票行为的影响.研究结果表明,当公司收到并购重组问询函后,全体股东投票参与率、中小股东投票参与率均显著提升,同时全体股东投赞同票比例和中小股东投赞同票比例均显著降低.调节效应检验结果显示,公司并购经验越少或产品市场竞争程度越低,收到并购重组问询函后,全体股东投票参与率和中小股东投票参与率越高;高管持股比例越低,收到并购重组问询函后,中小股东投票参与率越高,全体股东投赞同票比例和中小股东投赞同票比例越低.
Abstract
Using the sample of material asset restructuring events of Shanghai and Shenzhen A-share listed companies from 2015 to 2020,this paper investigates the influence of inquiry letter supervision on shareholders'voting behavior in M&A decisions.The results show that when the company receives an M&A inquiry letter,the voting participation rates of all shareholders and minority shareholders increase significantly,while the voting approval ratios of all shareholders and minority shareholders decrease significantly.The results of the moderating effect test show that when the company has less M&A experience or the degree of competition in the product market is lower,the voting participation rates of all shareholders and minority shareholders are higher after receiving the M&A inquiry letter.The lower the percentage of shares held by executives,the higher the voting participation rate of minority shareholders and the lower the voting approval ratios of all shareholders and minority shareholders after receiving the M&A inquiry letter.
关键词
问询函监管/重大资产重组/股东投票/并购决策Key words
inquiry letter supervision/material asset restructuring/shareholder voting/M&A decision引用本文复制引用
基金项目
国家社会科学基金一般项目(21BJY207)
出版年
2024
国家科技期刊平台
NSTL
维普
万方数据