Using the sample of material asset restructuring events of Shanghai and Shenzhen A-share listed companies from 2015 to 2020,this paper investigates the influence of inquiry letter supervision on shareholders'voting behavior in M&A decisions.The results show that when the company receives an M&A inquiry letter,the voting participation rates of all shareholders and minority shareholders increase significantly,while the voting approval ratios of all shareholders and minority shareholders decrease significantly.The results of the moderating effect test show that when the company has less M&A experience or the degree of competition in the product market is lower,the voting participation rates of all shareholders and minority shareholders are higher after receiving the M&A inquiry letter.The lower the percentage of shares held by executives,the higher the voting participation rate of minority shareholders and the lower the voting approval ratios of all shareholders and minority shareholders after receiving the M&A inquiry letter.
inquiry letter supervisionmaterial asset restructuringshareholder votingM&A decision
国家科技期刊平台
NSTL
万方数据
维普
