The information disclosure by industries is a reflection of high-quality regulation under the registration-based IPO system.This paper constructs a difference-in-differences model based on the phased issuance of Industry Information Disclosure Guidelines by the Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges,which serves as a quasi-natural experiment,to empirically analyze whether the industrial information disclosure obligation changes companies'strategic information disclosure behavior.Our findings suggest that requiring listed companies to disclose industry operational information can improve the quality of the management earnings forecast.Additionally,information transparency,analyst coverage,legal environment,attributes of the earnings forecast,and operational risks play a moderating role in the impact of information disclosure by industries on the quality of earnings forecasts.Accounting conservatism and the comparability of accounting information are potential mechanisms.This study contributes to understanding the impact of industry-specific information disclosure policies on the disclosure behavior of listed companies regarding earnings forecasts and provides insights for improving the earnings forecast system in China.
regulation by industriesinformation disclosureearnings forecastscorporate governance
国家科技期刊平台
NSTL
万方数据
