This study investigates the impact of merger and acquisition(M&A)comment letters on the avoidance of goodwill impairment.The study finds that the M&A transaction with higher goodwill risk is more likely to receive M&A comment letters and at the same time,the company tends to engage in the avoidance of goodwill impairment in response to the pressure from receiving M&A comment letters.The greater the inquiry intensity,the more attention the company pays and the more pronounced the company's behavior in the avoidance of goodwill impairment.From the perspective of the mechanism,M&A comment letters draw attention from external parties,such as institutional investors and analysts,which increases the performance pressure of the company,thereby leading to the avoidance of goodwill impairment.The results of heterogeneity tests indicate that companies with motives to"take a big bath,"state-owned enterprises,and companies with high transparency of accounting information exhibit significantly less behavior in the avoidance of goodwill impairment after receiving M&A comment letters.The findings of this study comply with the theory of impression management and provide a theoretical basis and practical insights for regulatory agencies to strengthen the regulation on goodwill.
M&Aregulatory inquiriesavoidance of goodwill impairmentimpression management
万方数据
维普
