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超额商誉与内部人减持

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近年来,并购活动引发的商誉泡沫现象引起了实务界和学术界的广泛关注.本文从内部人减持角度,以2007-2021年A股上市公司为研究对象,考察超额商誉对内部人减持的影响及其作用机制.研究发现,超额商誉会加剧内部人减持.进一步,机制检验表明,超额商誉会通过增加分析师乐观偏差和企业经营风险来影响内部人减持.异质性分析发现,在信息透明度越低、机构持股比例越低、内部人短视越严重的企业,超额商誉加剧内部人减持的作用更明显.此外,超额商誉会加剧内部人清仓式减持;且内部人减持后,企业计提商誉减值的概率和金额会显著增加.本文对进一步规范和完善商誉信息披露制度、保护中小投资者利益具有重要的启示意义.
In recent years,the phenomenon of goodwill bubbles caused by M&A activities has attracted widespread attention from practitioners and academics.From the perspective of insider sales,using A-share listed companies from 2007 to 2021 as the research subjects,this paper examines the impact of excess goodwill on insider sales and its influencing mechanism.The paper finds that excess goodwill exacerbates insider sales.Furthermore,the mechanism test shows that excess goodwill affects insider sales by increasing analysts'optimistic bias and corporate operating risk.The heterogeneity analysis finds that the impact of excess goodwill on exacerbating insider sales is more pronounced in companies with lower information transparency,lower institutional ownership,and more severe insider myopia.In addition,excess goodwill exacerbates full-scale insider sales.Moreover,the probability and amount of accrued goodwill impairment significantly increase after insider sales.This study has important implications for further standardizing and improving the goodwill information disclosure system and protecting the interests of minority shareholders.

excess goodwillinsider salesanalysts'optimistic biasoperating riskgoodwill impairment

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中原工学院经济管理学院,河南 郑州 451191

超额商誉 内部人减持 分析师乐观偏差 经营风险 商誉减值

河南省软科学研究计划河南省哲学社会科学规划项目

2324004120332022BJJ117

2024

证券市场导报
深圳证券交易所综合研究所

证券市场导报

CSTPCDCSSCICHSSCD北大核心
影响因子:1.331
ISSN:1005-1589
年,卷(期):2024.(6)