This paper uses the comprehensive online voting system for shareholders'meetings as a quasi-natural experiment to empirically examine the impact of shareholder supervision on management manipulation behavior under digital empowerment,using the data of A-share listed companies on the Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges from 2010 to 2020.The findings are summarized as follows.(1)The comprehensive online voting system for shareholders'meetings effectively restrains managerial tone manipulation behavior,exhibiting a feature where the"cost effect"outweighs the"benefit effect."This conclusion holds after a series of robustness tests.(2)The comprehensive online voting system for shareholders'meetings has the characteristic of digital supervision,which increases the cost of managerial tone manipulation behavior by facilitating information transmission and improving governance efficiency,thereby restricting managerial tone manipulation behavior.(3)The constraint effect of the comprehensive online voting system for shareholders'meetings is more pronounced for enterprises with poorer audit quality,higher financing constraints,lower political connections,and lower institutional investor ownership,as well as for local state-owned and non-state-owned enterprises.(4)The long-term impact of digital empowerment on shareholder supervision follows a pattern where the"benefit effect"dominates initially,followed by the"cost effect."The conclusions of this paper are of significant importance for actively innovating digital supervision models and effectively preventing corporate misconduct.
digital empowermentshareholder supervisioncomprehensive online voting systemmanagerial tone manipulation
国家科技期刊平台
NSTL
万方数据
