On the basis of distinguishing two types of mixed reform situations of"two-way"mixed-ownership reform and from the formal and informal institutional perspectives,this paper constructs a model of the participation of non-controlling shareholders in governance from three dimensions of equity governance,high-level governance,and network governance,and examines the intrinsic relationship between the participation of non-controlling shareholders in governance and the capital allocation efficiency of enterprises.The study shows that the participation of non-controlling shareholders in governance can improve the capital allocation efficiency of enterprises in the context of"two-way"mixed-ownership reform.The participation of non-controlling shareholders in governance can improve the capital allocation efficiency of state-owned enterprises mainly by the balance effect rather than the resource effect,while the participation of non-controlling shareholders in governance can improve the capital allocation efficiency of private enterprises mainly by the resource effect rather than the balance effect.The participation of non-controlling shareholders in governance improves the capital allocation efficiency of state-owned enterprises by alleviating the soft budget constraint and suppressing the over-investment of state-owned enterprises.This paper is conducive to guiding non-controlling shareholders to better perform their governance role from the perspective of"two-way"mixed-ownership reform.
the participation of non-controlling shareholders in governancecapital allocation efficiency"two-way"mixed-ownership reform
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