The Boundary of the Phenomenon:From the Perspective of Husserl and Heidegger's Phenomenology
This paper argues that the true breakthrough of the phenomenology initiated by Husserl,in relation to earlier philosophical traditions,lies in the"de-metaphysicalization"of phenomenon in the metaphysical sense.From a phenomenological perspective,traditional metaphysics,in its inquiry into the origin of being,presupposes a pre-reflective and naive belief in being—that there exists something independent,objective,and self-subsistent.This commitment to being is regarded as a"natural attitude"in Husserlian phenomenology and as a"forgetting of Being"in Heideggerian existential phenomenology.Both notions express a shared understanding:the pre-phenomenological metaphysical tradition assumes there is a"something"that is truly or self-evidently existent,forming the substance,essence,origin,or noumenon of all beings.Thus,pre-phenomenological metaphysics is grounded in two fundamental principles:the distinction between noumenon(or essence)and phenomenon,and the priority of noumenon over phenomenon.In this framework,noumenon remains hidden,while phenomenon serves as a sensuous,pale,non-intrinsic,and often distorted manifestation of noumenon.Consequently,phenomena are superficial,non-essential,accidental,and even false,whereas noumenon lurks behind phenomena,remaining unmanifest.This binary distinction has pervaded the dominant metaphysical tradition from Plato to Hegel,wherein phenomenon is assigned an absolute boundary—noumenon.Conversely,phenomenology perceives phenomena as"self-givenness"or"self-manifestation".For phenomenology,there exists no noumenon or origin outside of phenomena or self-manifestation.It is indeed the case that phenomenology also addresses"origin".Husserl asserts that phenomenology,as a philosophical discipline,is"essentially a science of true beginnings,of origin,and of the origin of all things".However,by"origin",he refers not to an unmanifest essence beyond or after the phenomenon,but to an original phenomenon—direct,living"self-manifestation".Similarly,in Being and Time,Heidegger describes phenomenon as the intertwining of human being or Dasein and the world,which he terms Daseins"Being-in-the-world".By redefining"phenomenon"as self-giving or self-manifestation,phenomenology not only distinguishes itself from metaphysics but also establishes a new philosophical approach.Unlike metaphysics,which inquires into or deduces noumenon or origin after"phenomenon",phenomenology describes the self-manifestation of the world of meanings.In his Logical Investigations,regarded as the foundation of phenomenology,Husserl emphasizes that the fundamental characteristic distinguishing phenomenology from previous philosophical traditions is its complete"presuppositionlessness".This means phenomenology focuses solely on what is manifestly given and does not assume any metaphysical premises.Nevertheless,within its own logic,phenomenology appears to confront a problem akin to that of metaphysics:does the phenomenon it discusses also possess boundaries?Here,Husserl diverges fundamentally from Heidegger(especially his later work)and French phenomenological philosophers such as Emmanuel Levinas,Michel Henry,and Jean-Luc Marion.Husserl categorically denies that phenomena have boundaries.He contends that everything that is not a phenomenon or does not manifest can,through necessary"phenomenological reduction",become manifest and thus be recognized as a phenomenon.In contrast,Heidegger and the French phenomenologists argue otherwise.Heidegger asserts that the phenomenon in phenomenology inherently includes dimensions that are non-phenomenal or unmanifest.Later,he claims that true phenomenology is precisely a"phenomenology of the unmanifest".Influenced by this perspective,the French phenomenologists further catalyze a"theological turn"in phenomenology,understanding the boundaries of phenomena as theologically primordial,such as the"face of the Other"(Levinas),"auto-affection"(Henry),or"the gift"(Marion).
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