政治思想史2024,Vol.15Issue(3) :150-167.

公民友谊如何证成公共理性?——基于罗尔斯公民身份理念的再考察

How Does Civic Friendship Justify Public Reason?——A Re-examination Based on Rawls's Idea of Citizenship

杜笑文
政治思想史2024,Vol.15Issue(3) :150-167.

公民友谊如何证成公共理性?——基于罗尔斯公民身份理念的再考察

How Does Civic Friendship Justify Public Reason?——A Re-examination Based on Rawls's Idea of Citizenship

杜笑文1
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作者信息

  • 1. 华东师范大学人文社会科学学院
  • 折叠

摘要

在罗尔斯对公共理性最后的解释中,他指出该理念的作用是把政治关系确定为一种公民友谊.在此背景下,最近一些学者进一步阐发了该想法,并主张公民友谊是公共理性的规范基础.然而,此观点面临"无效证成"的指控,因为公民友谊同时也能为非公共理性社会提供证成.对此,依据罗尔斯的公民身份理念,公民友谊的核心应当是信任的纽带.维系这种相互信任要求公民共享关于合理理由的评估标准,以确保他们的观点具有可及性,而公共理性本质上就是这种可共享的评估标准.这种基于公民身份理念的再考察能够回应"无效证成"的指控.

Abstract

In Rawls's last interpretation of public reason,he points out that its role is to specify the political relation as one of civic friendship.In this context,recent scholars have further elaborated on this idea,advocating that civic friendship is the normative foundation of public reason.However,this view faces the charge of invalid justification,since civic friendship could equally justify non-public reason societies.In response,based on Rawls's idea of citizenship,the core of civic friendship should be bonds of trust.Maintaining this mutual trust requires citizens to share evaluative standards regarding reasonable reasons,ensuring that their views are accessible,which is precisely what public reason itself provides as a shareable evaluative standard.This re-examination grounded in the idea of citizenship is able to address the charge of invalid justification.

关键词

罗尔斯/公共理性/公民友谊/规范基础

Key words

Rawls/public reason/civic friendship/normative foundation

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出版年

2024
政治思想史
天津师范大学

政治思想史

CHSSCD
影响因子:0.151
ISSN:1674-8662
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