首页|Axiomatizations of Dutta-Ray's egalitarian solution on the domain of convex games
Axiomatizations of Dutta-Ray's egalitarian solution on the domain of convex games
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NSTL
Elsevier
We show that on the domain of convex games, Dutta-Ray's egalitarian solution is characterized by core selection, aggregate monotonicity, and bounded richness, a new property requiring that the poorest players cannot be made richer within the core. Replacing "poorest "by "poorer "allows to eliminate aggregate monotonicity. Moreover, we show that the egalitarian solution is characterized by constrained welfare egalitarianism and either bilateral consistency a la Davis and Maschler or, together with individual rationality, by bilateral consistency a la Hart and Mas-Colell.(c) 2021 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
Dutta-Ray's egalitarian solutionAxiomatizationsAggregate monotonicityConvex TU gameMODIFIED NUCLEOLUSMONOTONICITYKERNELCORESET
NSTL
Elsevier
