首页|Informational robustness of common belief in rationality

Informational robustness of common belief in rationality

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  • NSTL
  • Elsevier
In this note, I explore the implications of informational robustness under the assumption of common belief in rationality. That is, predictions for incomplete-information games which are valid across all possible information structures. First, I address this question from a global perspective and then generalize the analysis to allow for localized informational robustness. (C) 2022 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

Informational robustnessRationalizabilityIncomplete informationBayesian gameCORRELATED EQUILIBRIUMGAMESIMPLEMENTATIONRATIONALIZABILITYHIERARCHIES

Ziegler, Gabriel

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Univ Edinburgh

2022

10.1016/j.geb.2022.01.025

Games and economic behavior

Games and economic behavior

SSCI
ISSN：0899-8256
年,卷(期)：2022.132
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