查看更多>>摘要：This paper analyzes strategic information transmission between a sender and a receiver with similar objectives. We provide a first-order approximation of the equilibrium behavior in the general version of the Crawford and Sobel's (1982) model with a small bias. Our analysis goes beyond the usual uniform-quadratic setting: we uncover how the state-dependent bias and the non-uniform state distribution influence the precision with which each state of the world is communicated. We illustrate the approach by providing novel comparative statics results in different applications. (c) 2022 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
查看更多>>摘要：Individuals are less likely to make morally desirable decisions when they are in groups. I study when this phenomenon makes groups less likely to produce a morally desirable outcome than one individual alone. I formulate and test a model in which a moral outcome occurs if at least one individual makes a costly decision. Using a lab experiment and data from field experiments on the bystander effect, I show that if most individuals are moral, the moral outcome is more likely to be produced by one individual, whereas if most individuals are immoral, it is more likely to be produced by a group. This rule is not only useful for reconciling previous mixed evidence on moral decision-making in groups, but may also be applied to better design organizations and institutions. (C) 2022 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
查看更多>>摘要：We consider a model where players can actively form a limited number of links with other players to play a general class of size-dependent coordination games. This class of games includes multi-person binary action coordination games, minimum effort games, average opinion games, and others, and it is mainly characterized by strategic complementarities among actions. Whenever players may only support links to a relatively small number of other players, the most efficient convention will be selected, irrespective of the details of the size-dependent coordination games. When the linking constraint becomes less restrictive, the most efficient convention will still be selected, provided that the most efficient action delivers a relatively high output when played against a small group also using it. Furthermore, for the special case of size-dependent minimum effort games, the second most efficient convention may be selected. (C) 2022 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
查看更多>>摘要：We study effort provision and the development of the belief that effort matters over time: a student is uncertain whether she has control over success through her effort or whether success is determined by her innate ability, which she also does not know. In each period, what she can learn about her control and her ability depends on the level of effort she exerts. The student's optimal effort policy in this two-dimensional bandit problem takes the form of a linear belief cutoff rule and typically features repeated switching of the effort level. Moreover, we define perseverance and procrastination as indices for the student's behavior over time and analyze how they are affected by control, cost, and confidence. Finally, we relate our results to findings in educational psychology and discuss policies to foster perseverance and to lower procrastination. (C) 2022 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
查看更多>>摘要：This paper examines experimentally how reputational uncertainty and the rate of change of the social environment determine cooperation. Reputational uncertainty significantly decreases cooperation, while a fast-changing social environment only causes a second order qualitative increase in cooperation. At the individual level, reputational uncertainty induces more leniency and forgiveness in imposing network punishment through the link proposal and removal processes, inhibiting the formation of cooperative clusters. However, this effect is significant only in the fast-changing environment and not in the slow-changing environment. A substitution pattern between network punishment and action punishment (retaliatory defection) explains this discrepancy across the two social environments. (C)& nbsp;& nbsp;2022 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
查看更多>>摘要：Semi-consistent conditional preferences are inconsistent enough for different ambiguity attitudes to manifest themselves in different behavior and consistent enough for information to be generically valuable. To simultaneously achieve these two desiderata I assume exactly one type of dynamic inconsistency: agents do not update their preferences upon learning independent randomization outcomes. (C)& nbsp;2022 Published by Elsevier Inc.
查看更多>>摘要：The linear tracing procedure plays a central role in the equilibrium selection theory of Harsanyi and Selten (1988). Nevertheless, it fails to always select a perfect equilibrium when there are more than two players. To fill this gap, we develop a variant of the linear tracing procedure by constituting a perturbed game in which each player maximizes her payoff against a linear convex combination between a totally mixed prior belief profile and a given mixed strategy profile of other players. Applying the optimality conditions to the integration of the perturbed game and a convex-quadratic-penalty game, we establish with a fixed-point argument and transformations on variables the existence of a smooth path from a unique starting point to a perfect equilibrium. Moreover, we present a variant of Harsanyi's logarithmic tracing procedure and a simplicial linear tracing procedure to select a perfect equilibrium.
Saur, Marc P.Schlatterer, Markus G.Schmitt, Stefanie Y.
18页
查看更多>>摘要：We analyze the implications of consumers' limited perception in a model of horizontal product differentiation. Consumers with limited perception do not necessarily notice all goods in the market. Limited perception thus offers a market segmentation into consumers who notice only one good and consumers who notice all goods. Our objective is to analyze whether less perception is harmful to consumers when firms use this segmentation to price discriminate. We show that product differentiation under limited perception is less extreme than under full perception. Consequently, despite firms' ability to price discriminate, average prices may be lower under limited than under full perception. In addition, we show that consumer surplus and welfare are not maximized under full perception but increase for some degree of limited perception.(c) 2022 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
Veszteg, Robert F.Kamijo, YoshioFunaki, YukihikoTakeuchi, Ai...
30页
查看更多>>摘要：Using experimental data, we show that the characteristics of the joint production process have a notable impact on the distribution of bargaining agreements. The setting in which the jointly produced surplus is expressed to be proportional to individual inputs leads to significantly more proportional bargaining agreements. This is in contrast to the setting in which the surplus is expressed as an additive constant, where bargaining agreements are more in line with the Nash bargaining solution. (c) 2022 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
查看更多>>摘要：We revisit the basic variant of the classical secretary problem. We propose a new approach in which we separate between an agent (the sender) that evaluates the secretary performance and one (the receiver) that makes the hiring decision. The sender signals the quality of the candidate to the hiring agent. Whenever the two agents' interests are not fully aligned, this induces an information transmission (signaling) challenge for the sender. We study the sender's optimization problem subject to persuasiveness constraints for the receiver in several variants of the problem. Our results quantify the loss in performance for the sender due to online arrival. We provide optimal and near-optimal persuasive mechanisms. In most cases the sender can recover at least a constant fraction of the utility that he would have obtained had he been able to access all information at the outset. (C) 2022 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
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