首页|Continuity and incentive compatibility in cardinal mechanisms

Continuity and incentive compatibility in cardinal mechanisms

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  • NSTL
  • Elsevier
In models without transfers, we show that every cardinal incentive compatible voting mechanism satisfying a continuity condition, can only take ordinal, but not cardinal information into account. Our results apply to many standard models in mechanism design without transfers, including the standard voting models with any domain restrictions. (C) 2020 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

Cardinal mechanism designOrdinal mechanism designIncentive compatibilityStrategic voting

2020

10.1016/j.jmateco.2020.02.004

Journal of Mathematical Economics

Journal of Mathematical Economics

ISSHP
ISSN：0304-4068
年,卷(期)：2020.88
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