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Delegation and ambiguity in correlated equilibrium
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NSTL
Elsevier
In the context of normal-form games with complete information, we introduce a notion of correlated equilibrium that allows partial delegation to a mediator and ambiguity in the correlation device. Without ambiguity, the sets of equilibrium action distributions are equivalent to those for coarse correlated equilibrium (Moulin and Vial, 1974). With correlation devices that incorporate ambiguity, any action distribution that Pareto dominates a coarse correlated equilibrium or a correlated equilibrium (Aumann, 1974), can be approximated with an arbitrary degree of precision using the proposed equilibrium notion. These approximations are attained in one-shot, static strategic interactions, and do not require repeated play. We also analyze such equilibria when the set of feasible posteriors is exogenously constrained, which yields, as a special case, a definition and characterization of an "ambiguous correlated equilibrium" that does not require delegation to the mediator. (C) 2022 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
NSTL
Elsevier
