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Strategic communication with a small conflict of interest
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NSTL
Elsevier
This paper analyzes strategic information transmission between a sender and a receiver with similar objectives. We provide a first-order approximation of the equilibrium behavior in the general version of the Crawford and Sobel's (1982) model with a small bias. Our analysis goes beyond the usual uniform-quadratic setting: we uncover how the state-dependent bias and the non-uniform state distribution influence the precision with which each state of the world is communicated. We illustrate the approach by providing novel comparative statics results in different applications. (c) 2022 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
Strategic communicationSmall biasCENTRAL BANK COMMUNICATIONCHEAP TALKCOMPETENCEAUTHORITYPOLICY
NSTL
Elsevier
