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Bandwagon effects and constrained network formation

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We consider a model where players can actively form a limited number of links with other players to play a general class of size-dependent coordination games. This class of games includes multi-person binary action coordination games, minimum effort games, average opinion games, and others, and it is mainly characterized by strategic complementarities among actions. Whenever players may only support links to a relatively small number of other players, the most efficient convention will be selected, irrespective of the details of the size-dependent coordination games. When the linking constraint becomes less restrictive, the most efficient convention will still be selected, provided that the most efficient action delivers a relatively high output when played against a small group also using it. Furthermore, for the special case of size-dependent minimum effort games, the second most efficient convention may be selected. (C) 2022 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

Bandwagon effectsCoordination gamesLearningNetwork formationLONG-RUNEQUILIBRIUM SELECTIONSTRATEGIC UNCERTAINTYSTATISTICAL-MECHANICSSOCIAL COORDINATIONEVOLUTIONGAMESMODEL

Cui, Zhiwei、Shi, Fei

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Renmin Univ China

Shanghai Jiao Tong Univ

2022

Games and economic behavior

Games and economic behavior

SSCI
ISSN:0899-8256
年,卷(期):2022.134
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