查看更多>>摘要：In the context of normal-form games with complete information, we introduce a notion of correlated equilibrium that allows partial delegation to a mediator and ambiguity in the correlation device. Without ambiguity, the sets of equilibrium action distributions are equivalent to those for coarse correlated equilibrium (Moulin and Vial, 1974). With correlation devices that incorporate ambiguity, any action distribution that Pareto dominates a coarse correlated equilibrium or a correlated equilibrium (Aumann, 1974), can be approximated with an arbitrary degree of precision using the proposed equilibrium notion. These approximations are attained in one-shot, static strategic interactions, and do not require repeated play. We also analyze such equilibria when the set of feasible posteriors is exogenously constrained, which yields, as a special case, a definition and characterization of an "ambiguous correlated equilibrium" that does not require delegation to the mediator. (C) 2022 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
查看更多>>摘要：We examine affirmative action, class-based (CAA), as well as identity-based (IAA), in an economy with income heterogeneity and diverse identity groups. With CAA there exists a unique colour-blind equilibrium where assignment to skilled jobs depends on class, but not on identity. Whereas with IAA, there is a unique equilibrium that exhibits patronisation, i.e. black workers of both income classes face lower standards relative to their white counterparts. Comparing CAA with IAA, poor white workers prefer CAA, which 'favours' them, over IAA which does not, with rich black workers preferring IAA for a similar reason. Interestingly, whenever the proportion of black workers equal that of the poor, poor black workers who are helped by both forms of affirmative action prefer CAA, whereas rich white workers who are hurt by both, prefer IAA. We also examine the case where these proportions differ. (C) 2022 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
查看更多>>摘要：The paper introduces coalition structures to study belief-free full implementation. When the mechanism designer does not know which coalitions are admissible, we provide necessary and almost sufficient conditions on when a social choice function is robustly coalitionally implementable, i.e., implementable regardless of the coalition pattern and the belief structure. Robust coalitional implementation is a strong requirement that imposes stringent conditions on implementable social choice functions. However, when the mechanism designer has additional information on which coalitions are admissible, we show that coalitional manipulations may help a mechanism designer to implement social choice functions that are not robustly implementable in the sense of Bergemann and Morris (2009, 2011). As different social choice functions are implementable under different coalition patterns, the paper provides insights on when agents should be allowed to play cooperatively. (C) 2022 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
查看更多>>摘要：We present an axiomatic model of a process wherein likelihoods of eventualities are compared based on data. One eventuality is perceived as more likely than another whenever the data corroborates this conclusion. However, the correct relevance of records to the eventualities under consideration may be impossible to ascertain with any degree of surety due to multiple interpretations of the data, formalized by allowing the evaluator to entertain multiple weighting functions. The evaluator ranks one eventuality as more likely than another whenever its total weight over the entire database is higher, according to all relevance-weighting functions. Otherwise, the comparison is indecisive. (C) 2022 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
查看更多>>摘要：In this note, I explore the implications of informational robustness under the assumption of common belief in rationality. That is, predictions for incomplete-information games which are valid across all possible information structures. First, I address this question from a global perspective and then generalize the analysis to allow for localized informational robustness. (C) 2022 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
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